Introduction
belong to two different levels of confidentiality, thus allowing the specification of multilevel (actually, two-level) systems. As for CCS, the model used to describe the operational semantics of SPA is the labelled transition system model [13] , where the states are the terms of the algebra.
The operational semantics for a SPA term E is the portion of the SPA labelled transition system (lts, for short) reachable from the initial state E. Then, in order to express that certain states are indistinguishable by an external observer, it is defined a behavioural semantics for SPA as an equivalence relation over terms/states. In this way the semantics of a certain SPA term becomes the class of terms observationally indistinguishable from it. For some of the investigated information flow properties, we provided useful algebraic characterizations. They are all of the following form. Let E be an SPA process term, let X be a security property, let be a semantic equivalence among process terms and let C X and D X be two SPA contexts 4 for property X. Then, we can say:
E is X-secure if and only if C X E] D X E].
Hence, checking the X-security of E is reduced to the "standard" problem of checking semantic equivalence between two terms having E as a subterm. In recent years a certain number of tools for checking semantic equivalence have been presented; among them, the Concurrency Workbench (CW for short) [2] is one of the most famous.
The first aim of this work is to present a tool called Compositional Security Checker which can be used to check automatically (finite state) SPA specifications against some information flow security properties. The tool has the same modular architecture of CW (Version 6.1), from which some modules have been integrally imported and some others only modified. The tool is equipped with a parser, which transforms an SPA specification into a parse-tree; then, for the parsed specification, CoSeC builds the labelled transition system following the operational rules defined in Plotkin' SOS style [16] . When a user wants to check if an SPA process E is X-secure, CoSeC first provides operational semantic descriptions to the terms C X E] and D X E] in the form of two lts's; then verifies the semantic equivalence of C X E] and D X E] using their lts
representations.
An interesting feature of CoSeC is the exploitation of the compositionality of some security properties in order to avoid, in some cases, the exponential state explosion due to the parallel composition operator. To be more explicit, consider two agents E 1 and E 2 ; the number of states of the lts rooted in the state E 1 jE 2 is equal to the product of the states of the lts's rooted in E 1 and E 2 . Now if we have a compositional security property X, i.e. such that F 1 jF 2 is X-secure whenever F 1 and F 2 are X-secure, then we can apply the following strategy: check the X-security of E 1 and E 2 ; if it is satisfied, then conclude that E 1 jE 2 is X-secure, otherwise check the X-security of the whole agent E 1 jE 2 . Hence, for compositional security properties, CoSeC can avoid the complexity of the exponential state explosion if the components are also secure.
The second aim of the work is to assess the merits of the various information flow properties presented in this paper. We do this by showing, through a running example, which kind of flows are detectable by the various properties. In particular we want to show that certain properties are not appropriate to deal with some kind of information flows and so it is necessary to strengthen them or, if this is not possible, to follow a different approach.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present SPA, together with the first version of our running example: an access monitor. In Section 3 we recall from [5] some of the security properties which are verified by CoSeC, giving some variations of the access monitor example. Section 4.1 reports the input-output behavior of CoSeC, while Section 4.2 describes the architecture of the tool. The implementation of the security predicates is the subject of Section 5. Then, a sample session with the interactive tool is described in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2 is devoted to the formal verification of the case-study. Section 7 is about the state explosion problem and the compositional algorithm. Finally, some concluding remarks about future research and related literature are reported in Section 8. 4 . An SPA context C is an SPA term "with a hole". E.g., C ?] = F + ?. The insertion of E in the context C, written as C E], has the effect of filling the hole with E. In the example, C E] = F + E.
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SPA, Semantic Equivalences and Value-Passing
2.1
The Model The model used to represent systems is the labelled transition system model [13] . A labelled transition system is essentially an automaton which can have possibly infinite states. "A significant advantage of having the model based on a standard notion like the automaton is that extensive literature and well-developed intuition become immediately applicable to the problem domain" (quoted from the DoD-NCSC Integrity report [15] ). In addition, labelled transition systems constitute the preferred semantic domain for the operational description of many concurrent languages. Definition 2.1 A labelled transition system (lts) is a triple (S; T; !) such that:
S is a set of states T is a set of labels (actions) ! S T S is a set of labelled transitions (S 1 ; ; S 2 ) 2 ! (or equivalently S 1 ! S 2 ) means that the system can move from the state S 1 to the state S 2 through the action .
2.2
The Language In the following, systems will be specified using the Security Process Algebra (SPA for short), a slight extension of Milner's CCS [14] , where the set of visible actions is partitioned into high level actions and low level ones in order to specify multilevel systems. 
A set Act = L f g of actions ( is the internal, invisible action), ranged over by .
A set K of constants, ranged over by Z.
The syntax of SPA agents is defined (as for CCS) as follows:
where L L and f : Act ! Act is such that f( ) = f( ); f( ) = . Moreover, for every constant Z there must be the corresponding definition: Z def = E, and any occurrence of a constant in E must be inside a prefix context (the so-called guardedness condition).
The only difference with respect to CCS is the restriction operator nn ; intuitively E nn L can execute all the actions E is able to do, provided that they do not belong to L. In CCS the corresponding operator n requires that the actions do not belong to L L. We need this slight modification in order to define, below in this Section, an additional input restriction operator. Concerning the other operators, we have that 0 is the empty process, which cannot do any action;
:E can do an action and then behaves like E; E 1 + E 2 can alternatively choose 6 to behave like E 1 or E 2 ; E 1 jE 2 is the parallel composition of E 1 and E 2 , where the executions of the two systems are interleaved, possibly synchronized on complementary input/output actions, producing an
5. Actually, only two-level systems can be specified; note that this is not a real limitation because it is always possible to deal with the multilevel case by grouping -in several ways -the various levels in two clusters. 6. For notational convenience, we use sometimes the P operator (indexed on a set) to represent a general n-ary (or even infinitary) sum operator.
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Prefix Table 1 . The operational rules for SPA. Now, we define the standard restriction operator of CCS (we will always use this one in the following) and two auxiliary operators, namely the hiding operator of CSP [10] and the input restriction operator, which are useful in characterizing some security properties in an algebraic style.
Intuitively, E n L can execute all the actions E is able to do, provided that they do not belong to L L, while E n I L requires that the actions of E do not belong to L \ I; E=L turns all the actions in L into internal 's.
Operational Semantics and Equivalences
Let E be the set of SPA agents, ranged over by E, F. Let L(E) denote the sort of E, i.e., the set of the (possibly executable) actions occurring syntactically in E. The sets of high level agents and low level ones are defined as E H
, there exist systems which executes both high and low level actions allowing communications between the two levels.
The operational semantics of SPA is the lts (E; Act; !), where the states are the terms of the algebra and the transition relation ! E Act E is defined by structural induction as the least relation generated by the axioms and inference rules reported in Table 1 . The operational semantics for an agent E is the subpart of the SPA lts reachable from the "root" E. Now we want to introduce the idea of observable behaviour: two systems should have the same denotation if and only if they cannot be distinguished by an external observer. The technique to obtain this is to define an equivalence relation over states/terms of the SPA lts, equating two processes when they are indistinguishable. In this way the semantics of a term becomes an equivalence class of terms.
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It is possible to define various equivalences of this kind, according to the power of the observers. We recall two of them. The first one is the classic definition of trace equivalence, according to which two agents are equivalent if they have the same execution traces. The second one instead considers more powerful observers that can discriminate agents also according to the time when the choices to follow one path or another in the lts have been taken. This equivalence is based on the concept of bisimulation [14] . 
Definition 2.2 The expression
We say that E 0 is reachable from E when 9 : E =) E 0 and we write E =) E 0 .
Definition 2.3
For any E 2 E the set T(E) of traces associated with E is defined as follows: T(E) = f 2 L j 9E 0 : E =) E 0 g. E and F are trace equivalent (notation E T F) if and only if T(E) = T(F).
We recall also the definition of weak bisimulation [14] over SPA agents. In the following E^ =) E 0 stands for E =) E 0 if 2 L, and for E ( !) E 0 if = (note that ( !) means "zero or more labelled transitions" while =) requires at least one labelled transition). In [14] it is proved that B is an equivalence relation, indeed. Moreover, it is easy to see that E B F implies E T F, as the latter is obtained by the former, forgetting the branching structure (i.e., the information about when choices are taken).
2.4
Value-Passing SPA
In this section we briefly present a value-passing extension of "pure" SPA (VSPA, for short). All the examples contained in this paper will be done using such value passing calculus, because it originates more readable specifications than those written in pure SPA. Here we present a very simple example of value-passing agent showing how it can be translated to a pure SPA agent. Then we define VSPA syntax and we sketch the semantics by translating a generic VSPA agent to a SPA one.
As an example, consider the following buffer cell [14] :
where x is a variable that can assume values in N I (in the following we will simply write x 2 N I ).
C reads a natural value n through action in and stores it in variable x, then such value is passed to agent C 0 which can give n as output through action out moving again to C. So C represents a buffer which may hold a single data item. 
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Now consider the prefix in(x). where the variables x 1 ; : : :; x n , the value expressions e 1 ; : : :; e n and e 0 1 ; : : :; e 0 n must be consistent with the arity of the action a and constant A respectively (the arity specifies the sorts of the parameters) and b is a boolean expression.
It is also necessary a definition for each constant A(x 1 ; : : :; x m ) def = E where E is a VSPA agent which may contain no free variables except x 1 ; : : :; x m (which must be distinct). In the following we will denote with E + the set of all the VSPA agents. As in [14] the semantics of the value-passing calculus is given as a translation to the pure calculus. The translations rests upon the idea that a single label a of VSPA with n parameters with sorts S 1 : : :S n , becomes the set of labels fa v1:::vn : v i 2 S i ; 8i 2 1; n]g in SPA. We consider only agents without free variables because if an agent has a free variable than it becomes a family of agents, one for each value of such variable. The translation can be given recursively on the structure of agents (see [14] for more details about this kind of translation).
Note that we do not partition the set of actions in two levels; we directly refer to the partition in the pure calculus. In this way it is possible for a certain action in VSPA to correspond, in the translation, to actions at different levels in SPA. This can be useful if we want a parameter representing the level of a certain action. As an example consider an action access r(l; x) with l 2 fhigh; lowg and x 2 1; n], representing a read request from a user at level l to an object x; we can assign the high level to the actions with l = high and the low level to the others in this way: access r(high; x) 2 Act H and access r(low; x) 2 Act L for all x 2 1; n].
2.5
The Access Monitor Here we give an example of VSPA agent specification. It is an access monitor which handles read and write requests on two binary variables enforcing the multilevel security policy. We will analyze and modify this example in the next sections in order to assess the merits of the various information flow properties we will propose. Figure 2 ) handles read and write requests from high and low level users on two binary objects: a high level variable and a low level one. It achieves no read up and no write down access control rules allowing a high level user to read from both objects and write only on the high one; conversely, a low level user is allowed to write on both objects and read only from the low one. Users interact with the monitor through the following access actions: access r(l; x); access w(l; x); write(l; z) where l is the user level (l = 0 low, l = 1 high), x is the object (x = 0 low, x = 1 high) and z is the binary value to be written. As an example, consider access r(0; 1) which represents a low level user (l = 0) read request from the high level object (x = 1), and access w(1; 0) followed by write(1; 0) which represents a high level user (l = 1) write request of value 0 (z = 0) on the low object (x = 0). Read results are returned to users through the output actions val(l; y). This can be also an error in case of a read-up request. Note that if a high level user tries to write on the low object -through access w(1; 0) followed by write(1; z) -such request is not executed and no error message is returned.
The complete translation of the VSPA agent Access Monitor 1 to CoSeC syntax for pure SPA is reported in Table 2 of Section 6.2. As an example, here we provide the translation of Object(x; y) to the pure calculus by means of the following four constant definitions: Object00 def = r00:Object00 + w00:Object00 + w01:Object01 Object01 def = r01:Object01 + w00:Object00 + w01:Object01 Object10 def = r10:Object10 + w10:Object10 + w11:Object11 Object11 def = r11:Object11 + w10:Object10 + w11:Object11
Some Information Flow Properties
In this section we present some of the security properties (see [5] for more details) which can be verified using CoSeC. The common intuition behind all these properties is that the low level users should not be able to deduce anything about high level users' activity. We start with Nondeterministic Non Interference (NNI, for short), which is a natural generalization (assuming two user groups only) to non-deterministic systems of the classic notion of Non Interference, proposed for deterministic systems in [8] . Intuitively, the high level does not interfere with the low level if and only if for every trace , there exists a trace 0 that contains no high level input actions and is equivalent to for a low level user. This may be expressed algebraically as:
Note that Access Monitor 1 of Example 2.5 is NNI. In fact, the next example shows that NNI is able to detect if the multilevel access control rules are not implemented correctly in the monitor.
Example 3.2
Consider the following modified monitor 7 which does not control write accesses:
In the following, if an agent is not specified (e.g. Object(x; y)) we mean that it has not been modified with respect to previous versions of the Access Monitor.
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Monitor 2 def = access r(l; x):(if x l then r(x; y):val(l; y):Monitor 2 else val(l; err):Monitor 2) + + access w(l;x):write(l; z):w(x; z):Monitor 2
Now it is possible for a high level user to write down (actions access w(1; 0) and access w(1; 1)) so the system is not secure. We have that NNI is able to detect this kind of direct flow.
Access Monitor In we have two accesses to the monitor: first a high level user modifies the value of the low object writing-down value 1 and then the low user reads value 1 from the object. If we purge of high level actions we obtain the sequence 0 = access r(0; 0):val(0; 1)
that cannot be a trace for Access Monitor 2, since it represents the reading by a low level user of value 1 in the low object but the low object is initialized to value 0. Moreover it is not possible to obtain a trace for Access Monitor 2 adding to 0 only high level outputs, because all the high level outputs in Access Monitor 2 are prefixed by high level inputs. Hence 0 is not a trace for (Access Monitor 2 n I Act H )=Act H too. In other words, it is not possible to find a trace 00 with the same low level actions of and without high level inputs.
Since 0 is a trace for agent Access Monitor 2=Act H but not for agent (Access Monitor 2 n I Act H )=Act H , we conclude that Access Monitor 2 is not NNI.
The next example shows that NNI is not adequate to deal with synchronous communications and, consequently, it is too weak for SPA agents. that cannot be a trace for Access Monitor 3 anymore because after every low level writings there must be a written up action. So, if a low level user succeeds in executing the two writing requests, then (s)he will know that some high level user has accepted the high level output written up (because of synchronous communications). In other words, a high level user can interfere with a low level one accepting or not the high level output written up and NNI is not able to detect this because it verifies only the high level input interferences over low level actions.
The example shows that synchronous communications induce a symmetry over inputs and outputs. So we define a symmetric form of NNI. It requires that, for every trace , the sequence 0 , obtained from deleting all the high level actions, is still a trace. This property is called Strong NNI (SNNI for short). The next example shows that trace equivalence -as the basic equivalence for security properties -is too weak; in particular, it is not able to detect deadlocks due to high level activities, that influence the security of a system. Example 3.6 Suppose we have a high level action h stop which explicitly stops the monitor.
Obviously, in such a case there is a possible deadlock caused by a high level activity. Consider the following system: h stop does not modify the low traces of the system. However, a low level user will certainly discover if the monitor stops, so it is important to detect such an event.
In order to detect this kind of flows, we introduce the bisimulation-based security properties BNNI and BSNNI, by substituting B for T in their SPA-based definitions. As expected, it can be proved [5] that each of these new properties is finer than its corresponding trace-based one. E.g. BSNNI SNNI.
Definition 3.7 (Bisimulation NNI, SNNI)
Considering again Access Monitor 4, we find out that it is not BSNNI, as observation equivalence is able to detect deadlocks. In particular, Access Monitor 4=Act H can move to 0 through an internal action , while Access Monitor 4 n Act H is not able to reach (in zero or more steps) a state equivalent to 0. Now we want to show that BSNNI and BNNI are still not able to detect some deadlocks due to high level activities. This will induce us to propose another property based on a different intuition. Let us consider Access Monitor 1. We can prove that such a system is BSNNI as well as BNNI. However, the following two dangerous situations are possible: (i) a high level user makes a read request without accepting the corresponding output from the monitor (remember that communications in SPA are synchronous) and (ii) a high level user makes a write request and do not send the value to be written. In both cases we have a deadlock due to a high level activity that BNNI and BSNNI are not able to reveal. To solve this problem, we are going to present a stronger property, called Bisimulation-based Non Deducibility on Compositions (BNDC, for short), we proposed in [5] . It is simply based on the idea of checking the system against all high level potential interactions. A system E is BNDC if for every high level process a low level user Figure 3 summarizes the relations among the bisimulation-based security properties (including another property we are going to present later). So we have that BNDC is stronger than BNNI and BSNNI. Note that BSNNI 6 BNNI while for trace equivalence we had that SNNI NNI. It is also interesting to observe that the trace based BNDC (NDC, for short) is exactly equal to SNNI (NDC = SNNI) [5] . So in the trace equivalence setting we gain nothing by introducing this new property.
Example 3.9
We want to show that Access Monitor 1 is not BNDC. Consider = access r(1; 1):0. System (Access Monitor 1j ) n Act H will be deadlocked immediately after the execution of the read request by , blocking in the following state
This happens because executes a read request and does not wait for the corresponding return value (action val). We conclude that can interfere with low level users. Since there are no possible deadlocks in process Access Monitor 1=Act H , we find out that (Access Monitor 1j ) n Act H 6 B Access Monitor 1=Act H , so Access Monitor 1 is not BNDC.
Moreover, there is another potential source of deadlock when a high level user makes a write request and do not send the value to be written. In particular, the high level user 0 = access w(1; 0):0 will deadlock (Access Monitor 1j 0 )nAct H immediately after the execution of the write request by 0 , blocking in the following state:
(((write(1; 0):M onitor + write(1; 1):M onitor) j Object(0; 0) j Object(1; 0)) n L j 0) n Act H Again, we have that (Access Monitor 1j 0 ) n Act H 6 B Access Monitor 1=Act H . In order to obtain a BNDC access monitor, we modify the monitor by adding an interface for each level which temporarily stores the output value of the monitor (passing it later to the users and thus making communication asynchronous) and that guarantees mutual exclusion within the same level; moreover, we use an atomic action for write request and value sending. Note that, because of the interface, actions access r; access w and val become a r; a w and put, respectively. The resulting system follows (see Figure 4 Interf (1) Interf(0) Object (1,y) Object The above definition of BNDC is difficult to use in practice, because of the universal quantification on processes. We need an alternative formulation of BNDC which avoids universal quantification, exploiting local information only; however, a solution to this problem is still to be found. Nonetheless, here we propose a sufficient condition for BNDC, namely the SBSNNI property, which exploits local information only and, moreover, is compositional (i.e. if two systems are SBSNNI their composition is SBSNNI, too).
Definition 3.10 (SBSNNI: Strong BSNNI)
A system E 2 SBSNNI if and only if for all E 0 reachable from E we have E 0 2 BSNNI.
SBSNNI is easily verifiable, as BSNNI is so; moreover, we can use it in order to check that a system is BNDC because of the following result (see Appendix A for the proof).
Proposition 3.11 SBSNNI BNDC
We end this section with a remark. In the automatic verification of properties, it can be very useful to work on a reduced system, i.e. a system equivalent to the original one, but with a minor number of states. In fact, the Concurrency Workbench provides a procedure that minimizes the number of states, thus reducing a lot the time spent in the verification. In order to see if this proof strategy can be used also in our case, we need to prove that if a system E is BNDC, then any other observational equivalent system F is BNDC too. Indeed, the theorem below (see Appendix A for the proof) shows that this is the case, also for all the other security properties we have discussed in this section. For this reason, we imported in CoSeC the minimization procedure of the Concurrency Workbench. 
What is the Compositional Security Checker
Input-Output
The inputs of CoSeC are concurrent systems expressed as SPA agents. The outputs are answers to questions like: "does this system satisfy that specific security property ?". The structure of CoSeC is described in Figure 5 . In detail, the tool is able:
to parse SPA agents, saving them in suitable environments as parse trees; to give a semantic to these parse trees, building the corresponding rooted labelled transition systems (rlts for short); to check if an agent satisfies a certain security property; the implemented routine for this purpose verifies the equivalence of two particular agents modeled as rlts. In this way, future changes of the language will not compromise the validity of the core of the tool.
Architecture
The CoSeC has the same general architecture of the CW. In its implementation we have decided to exploit the characteristic of versatility and extensibility of CW. In particular CoSeC maintains the strongly modular characteristic of CW. Figure 6 shows the architecture of CoSeC. The modules of the system have been partitioned in three main layers: interface layer, semantic layer, analysis layer. In the interface layer we have the command interpreter. It allows us to define the agents and the set of high level actions; it also allows to invoke the security predicates and the utility functions on the behaviour of an agent.
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Then we have a parser which recognizes the SPA syntax of agents and stores them as parse trees in appropriate environments. The partition of the set of visible actions in the sets of high and low level actions has been obtained by defining the set of high level actions; by default, all the other possible actions are considered at low level. Then we have defined a function that, according to the operational semantic rule of SPA, provides all possible transitions for an agent. This function allows the construction of the lts associated to an agent.
In the semantic layer, CoSeC uses two transformation routines to translate lts's to deterministic and observational graphs [2] respectively. Since they both refer to processes modeled as lts's, they have been imported from CW in CoSeC without any modification.
In the analysis layer, CoSeC uses a routine of equivalence and one of minimization that belong to the analysis layer of CW. These are a slight modification of the algorithm by Kanellakis and Smolka [12] which finds a bisimulation between the roots of two lts's by partitioning their states. It is interesting to note that a simple modification of this algorithm can be used to obtain the minimization of a finite state lts.
5
Checking the Security Properties with complexity, except for the intrinsic exponential explosion in the number of states of the rtls due to parallel composition. Phase b) (This is split in two depending on the semantics requested by the security predicate) b1: (for predicates NNI, SNNI, NDC) The two rlts's obtained in Phase a) are transformed into deterministic graphs following the classic subset construction (see e.g. [11] ). This algorithm has exponential complexity since it is theoretically possible, in the deterministic graph, to have a node for every subset of nodes in the original graph. However, experience shows that very often the number of obtained nodes is less than the number of nodes of the beginning graph because of the collapsing of the transitions. b2: (for predicates BNNI and BSNNI) The two rlts's obtained in Phase a) are transformed into observational graphs using the classic algorithms for the product of two relations and the reflexive transitive closure of a relation. This transformation has a O(n 3 ) complexity, in which n is the number of nodes in the original graph.
Phase c) (For all predicates)
The general equivalence algorithm [12] is applied to the graphs obtained in Phase b). Time and space complexities of this algorithm are O(k l) and O(k + l) respectively, where l is the number of nodes and k is the number of edges in the two graphs. This is not a limiting factor in the computation of the observational and trace 8 . In the CoSeC the hiding and input restriction operators are respectively represented by ! and ?, for easy of parsing.
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equivalences. In particular for the observational equivalence we have that in most cases 80% of computation time is due to the routine for reflexive transitive closure of Phase b).
Since SBSNNI is verified by testing BSNNI over all the n states of the original graph, the resulting complexity will be n times the BSNNI complexity.
It is interesting to observe that the exponential explosion of the number of nodes of the transition graphs (Phase a), due to the operator of parallel composition, influences negatively the following phases, but it can not be avoided because of its intrinsic nature. A solution to this problem for the predicates NNI, SNNI, NDC and SBSNNI could be based on the exploitation of compositional properties (see Section 7 for more details). 
Checking the Access Monitor
In this Section we use CoSeC to automatically check all the versions of the access monitor discussed in Example 3.9. Since CoSeC works on SPA agents we have to translate all the VSPA specifications to SPA. Consider once more Access Monitor 1. Table 2 reports the translation of Access Monitor 1 specification to the CoSeC syntax for SPA. 10 It has been used a new command basi which binds a set of actions to an identifier. Moreover, the n character at the end of a line does not represent the restriction operator, but is the special character that permits to break in more lines the description of long agents and long action lists.
We can write to a file the contents of 
Here we use the typewriter style for CoSeC messages (such as the prompt "Command:"); the bold style for CoSeC commands and the italic style for the remaining text (such as agents, sets) inserted by users.
10. In the translation, we use values fl; hg in place of f0;1g for the levels of users and objects in order to make the SPA specification clearer. As an example access r(1;0) becomes access r hl. basi L rh0 rh1 rl0 rl1 wh0 wh1 wl0 wl1 acth rh0 rh1 wh0 wh1 access_r_hh access_r_hl val_h0 val_h1 val_h_err \ access_w_hh access_w_hl write_h0 write_h1 Note that when CoSeC fails to verify SBSNNI on a process E, it gives as output an agent E 0 which is reachable from E and is not BSNNI.
UBLCS-96-14
So we have found that Access Monitor 1 2 BSNNI ; BNNI and Access Monitor 1 = 2 SBSNNI . Since SBSNNI BNDC BSNNI ; BNNI , we still don't know if Access Monitor 1 is BNDC or not. However, using the output state E 0 of the SBSNNI verification, it is easy to find a high level process which can deadlock the monitor. In fact, in the state given as output by SBSNNI, the monitor is waiting for the high level action 0 val h1; so, if we find a process which leads the system to such a state and does not execute the val h1 action, we will have a high level process able to deadlock the monitor. It is sufficient to consider = 0 access r hh:0. System (Access Monitor 1j ) n Act H will be deadlocked immediately after the execution of the read request by , blocking in the following state
(this state differs from the one given as output by SBSNNI only for the values stored in objects). It is possible to verify that Access Monitor 1 is not BNDC by checking that (Access Monitor 1j )n Act H 6 B Access Monitor 1=Act H using the following command:
Command: bi Pi 0 access r hh:0
Command: eq Agent: (Access Monitor 1 j Pi) n acth Agent: Access Monitor 1 ! acth false As we said in Example 3.9, such a deadlock is caused by synchronous communications in SPA. Moreover, using the CoSeC output again, we can find out that also the high level process 0 = 0 access w hl:0 can deadlock Access Monitor 1, because it executes a write request and does not send the corresponding value. Hence, in Example 3.9 we proposed the modified system Access Monitor 5 with an interface for each level and atomic actions for write request and value sending. We finally check that this version of the monitor is SBSNNI, hence BNDC too:
Command: sbsnni Access Monitor 5 true 7
State Explosion and Compositionality
We now want to plain out how the parallel composition operator can increase exponentially the number of states of the system, and then how it can slow down the execution speed of security As we will see, SBSNNI is a compositional property, so the two agents BjDjB and BjDjDjB must also be SBSNNI secure. Hence the verification of these two agents could be reduced to the verification of their two basic components B and D only. The time spent in verifying SBSNNI directly on BjDjB and BjDjDjB is very long. Using the size command of CoSeC, which computes the number of states of an agent, we can fill in Table 3 , which points out the exponential increase of the number of states and the consequent increase of the computation time for verification of SBSNNI. The next theorem states that SBSNNI is preserved by the parallel operator and the restriction one (see Appendix A for the proof). Similar results hold for NNI and SNNI [5] .
Theorem 7.1 The following hold:
In the following E FS E will denote the set of (closed and guarded) SPA agents with a finite lts. CoSeC is able to exploit the compositionality of security properties through an algorithmic schema we are going to present. For a certain compositional property P this schema also requires the following condition: if Z def = E and E is P-secure then also Z is P-secure. This condition is satisfied by all the above presented properties because of Theorem 3.12.
Definition 7.2 (Compositional Algorithm)
Let P E be a set of SPA agents such that E; E 0 2 P =) EjE 0 2 P E 2 P; L L =) E n L 2 P E 2 P; Z def = E =) Z 2 P and let A P be a decision algorithm which checks if a certain agent E 2 E FS belongs to P; in other words, A P (E) = true if E 2 P, A P (E) = false otherwise. Then we can define a compositional algorithm A 0 P (E) in the following way:
1) if E is of the form E 0 n L, then compute A 0 P (E 0 ); if A 0 P (E 0 ) = true then return true, else return the result of A P (E);
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2) if E is of the form E 1 jE 2 , then compute A 0 P (E 1 ) and A 0 P (E 2 ); if A 0 P (E 1 ) = A 0 P (E 2 ) = true then return true, else return the result of A P (E); 3) if E is a constant Z with Z def = E 0 , then return the result of A 0 P (E 0 ); 4) if E is not in any of the three forms above, then return A P (E).
The compositional algorithm A 0 P (E) works as the given algorithm A P (E) when the outermost operator of E is neither the restriction operator, nor the parallel one, nor a constant definition.
Otherwise, it applies componentwise to the arguments of the outermost operator; if the property does not hold for them, we cannot conclude that the whole system is not secure, and we need to check it with the given algorithm.
Note that the compositional algorithm exploits the assumption that property P is closed with respect to restriction and uses this in step 1. This could seem of little practical use, as the dimension of the state space for, let say, E is often bigger than that of E n L. However, parallel composition is often used in the form (AjB) n L in order to force some synchronizations, and so if we want to check P over A and B separately, we must be granted that P is preserved by both parallel and restriction operators.
To obtain the result for A 0 P (F), we essentially apply -in a syntax-driven way -the four rules above recursively, obtaining a proof tree having (the value of) A 0 P (F) as the root and the various (values of) A P (E)'s on the leaves for the subterms E of F on which the induction cannot be applied anymore. The following theorem justifies the correctness of the compositional algorithm, by proving that the evaluation strategy terminates and gives the same result as the given algorithm A P (F). PROOF. First we want to prove that, in computing A 0 P (F), if the evaluation of the given algorithm A P is required on an agent E, then E belongs to E FS . The proof is by induction on the proof tree for the evaluation of A 0 P (F). The base case is when F can be evaluated by step 4; as -by hypothesis -agent F is finite state, the thesis follows trivially. Instead, if F is of the form E 0 n L, then -by the premise of this theorem -E 0 2 E FS , and the inductive hypothesis can be applied. In step 2, as F = E 1 jE 2 , we have that E 1 ; E 2 2 E FS , and the inductive hypothesis can be applied to prove the thesis. Similarly for step 3, as constant Z is finite state if and only if the defining agent E 0 is so. So, when the algorithm executes A P (E) in steps 1, 2, 3 or 4, it always terminates because E 2 E FS .
To complete the proof concerning termination of the compositional algorithm, we still have to prove that the inductive evaluation, in steps 1, 2 and 3, cannot loop; in other words, that the proof tree for A 0 P (F) is finite. While it is obvious for cases 1 and 2 (no term can be a proper subterm of itself in a finite term), the thesis follows in case 3 because of the guardedness condition over SPA agents. Hence the calculation of A 0 P (F) terminates.
To prove that the result of the compositional algorithm A 0 P is consistent with the one obtained by the given algorithm A P , we observe that the four rules above guarantee this, using compositionality properties for steps 1 and 2.
The theorem above requires that -in evaluating A 0 P (E) -if E is in the form E 0 n L, then E 0 must be finite state. In fact, if we consider a finite state system E n L such that E = 2 E FS , then A P (E n L) terminates while A 0 P (E n L) possibly do not, because it tries to compute A P (E) on the non-finite state agent E.
The premise of the theorem above trivially holds for agents in the class of so-called nets of automata:
Command: c sbsnni Access Monitor 5 11 on a SUN5 workstation) because of the above mentioned exponential state explosion due to parallel composition. We could hope to get a better result using the compositional algorithm. 12 Hence, in this case, the compositional technique cannot help in order to reduce the execution time.
However, we can modify AM in order to obtain a SBSNNI system by making (only!) high level communications asynchronous. This can be done adding a high level buffer between the monitor and the interface. where j 2 f0; 1; err; emptyg, L = fr; w, val(1; y)g, N = fres, access r, access wg and res(1; y) 2 Act H ; 8y 2 f0; 1; err; emptyg, while the same actions with 0 as first parameter belong to Act L .
Note that we have modified the interface so that it is now able to wait until the high buffer is filled by the monitor.
Using the compositional algorithm, Access Monitor 6 can be checked very efficiently; the verification of property SBSNNI takes about 90 seconds (see Table 5 ). We can also check that Access Monitor 5 B Access Monitor 6; so, as expected, the introduction of the buffer does not modify the behaviour of the monitor. This verification requires about 2 minutes. Note that, by 11 . This value and all the following are obtained exploiting also the state minimization feature of the tool.
12. The reason why it fails on AM is because AM is essentially Access Monitor 1 with atomic writings; hence, it is not SBSNNI because of the possible high level deadlock of Example 3.9 caused by synchronous communications. The interface was introduced just in order to make communications asynchronous.
Command: c sbsnni Access Monitor 6 Access Monitor 6 represents an example of successful application of the compositional checking; nonetheless, this does not mean that we cannot do better. Indeed, such a system is not defined in a very modular way and we hope that the more the definition is modular, the more the compositional algorithm is efficient. In fact, suppose we want to add other objects to Access Monitor 6; in such a case, the size of AM 6 will increase exponentially with respect to the number of added objects. Now we present rather a modular version of the access monitor. The basic idea of this new version (Figure 7) is that every object has a "private" monitor which implements the access functions for such (single) object. To make this, we have decomposed process Monitor 5 into two different processes, one for each object; then we have composed such processes to their respective objects together with a high level buffer obtaining the SBSNNI-secure Modh and Modl agents. In particular, Monitor 7(x) handles the accesses to object x (x = 0 low, x = 1 high). As in Access Monitor 6, we have an interface which guarantees the exclusive use of the monitor within the same level and is able to read values from the high buffer. where L = fres; access r; access wg and Lh = fr; w; val(1; y)g. Table 6 reports the output of the (successful) verification of the SBSNNI property for Access Monitor 7. This task takes about 20 seconds on a SUN5 workstation, supporting our claim that a modular definition would help. Moreover, we can also check the new version of the monitor is functionally equivalent to the previous ones: in about 5 minutes, CoSeC checks that Access Monitor 7 B Access Monitor 5, and so also Access Monitor 7 B Access Monitor 6.
Access Monitor
As a final remark, the compositional verification is more convenient only when building complex systems as parallel composition of simpler ones. For this reason, the tool offers to the user the choice between the normal and the compositional verification algorithms. It is up to the user to choose which one (s)he thinks could go better, or even to make them work in parallel. (ii) Extension to value-passing SPA: it would be useful that CoSeC accept specification written directly in VSPA. Moreover, one could exploit interesting techniques, such as the one of [9] , that could be used to verify the equivalence of finite state value-passing SPA agents which have infinite state SPA translations.
(iii) Integration with other tools: CoSeC is essentially built on top of CW, but it is not difficult to imagine how to build similar routines on top of any of the available tools for verification of systems represented as labelled transition systems.
(iv) Addition of new information flow security properties: Even if we think BNDC is the right one, any new information flow property that has an algebraic characterization of the form seen in the Introduction can be included easily in CoSeC. Other future research will be devoted to study the merits of the information flow properties presented here, in particular of BNDC. In a forthcoming report [4] , we have defined the way to explicitly construct covert channels for all the versions of the Access Monitor that have been proved not BNDC in this paper, hence somehow supporting our claim. From a technical point of view, it would be nice to find a static, easily verifiable characterization of BNDC, instead of resorting -as we did here -to the stronger SBSNNI.
Related Work
In the literature, there is one relevant paper [18] which introduces some information flow security properties based on the notion of deterministic views and shows how to automatically verify them using the CSP model checker FDR [17] . The most interesting property is L-Sec which, however, requires the absence of non-determinism in the low view of the system (i.e. when hiding high actions through interleaving) and for this reason we think it could be too restrictive in a concurrent environment. For example, all the low non-deterministic systems -such as E = l: l 1 + l: l 2 -will be considered not secure. In [3] one of the authors has compared those properties with ours using a failure-equivalence version of BNDC, called FNDC. The first interesting result is that L-Sec is included in the class of low-deterministic and non-divergent processes. The main result of the paper is that BNDC is equal to L-Sec when applied to that particular class of systems. This implies that, for low-deterministic and non-divergent processes, we can use CoSeC to verify L-Sec. Moreover, we can see BNDC applied to low-deterministic processes as a fair extension of L-Sec to divergent processes.
